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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Why should the former President of Harvard University be concerned that during the 1970s and 
1980s the earnings of doctors, lawyers in private practice, and top corporate executives grew 
substantially relative to the earnings of professors, teachers, and high level federal civil servants? Why 
should he care that physicians with specialized hospital-based practices, such as neurosurgeons, have 
seen their earnings rise substantially relative to physicians practicing family medicine during the same 
period? 
In each case, the answer is that Bok believes that occupational choices are determined, at least at the 
margin, by the pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits that the various professions offer. Thus, he fears that 
the growing earnings differentials have diverted America's "best and brightest" away from occupations 
that he considers vitally important for our society, the professoriate, teaching, the federal civil service, and 
primary care medicine. Given this belief, his goal is to put forth a menu of reforms that might induce an 
increased supply of talented individuals to these occupations. 
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kind-either theoretical or empirical-mak- 
ing it difficult to evaluate. 
From a general discussion of personnel 
policies, Bloch then moves to an analysis of 
discrimination in recruitment. There is a co- 
gent review of the theoretical and empirical 
work on hiring discrimination (including a 
discussion of recent studies using matched 
pairs of black and white auditors to test for 
discrimination). The key insight of this sec- 
tion is that "word-of-mouth recruitment in 
conjunction with racial and ethnic segrega- 
tion . . . implies an advantage for those who 
are members of . . . groups with relatively 
many entrepreneurs" (p. 39). The main evi- 
dence offered for this proposition is a strong 
negative correlation between the unemploy- 
ment rate for each of six ethnic groups and 
the proportion of each group who are "entre- 
preneurs" (employees of their own corpora- 
tion). 
This is an interesting fact, but I find it less 
compelling than the author does. For one 
thing, we simply do not know much, if any- 
thing, about the relative strength of job-find- 
ing networks in minority and white communi- 
ties. Of the three studies Bloch cites, one 
concludes that blacks are more likely than 
whites to find their jobs through networks, 
while two find the opposite. Nor is it obvious 
why network linkages should depend on the 
race of a firm's owner: after all, word of 
mouth could link the black employees of a 
white-owned firm as well as a black-owned 
one. Finally, the link between hiring discrimi- 
nation and unemployment rates is theoreti- 
cally complicated: lower job offer rates for a 
group do not translate into higher unemploy- 
ment rates unless special conditions are met 
(Flinn and Heckman 1983). The book offers 
no sense of what these conditions are, or how 
likely they are to obtain in the real world. 
One of the author's main conclusions is 
that civil rights laws (including Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and various affirm- 
ative action programs) produced little relative 
gain for blacks after 1975, and outside of the 
South. Again, Bloch offers a nice survey of 
the literature on the effects of antidiscrimina- 
tion laws, and lists several reasons why these 
laws would not be expected to reduce hiring 
discrimination or relative unemployment 
rates significantly. Some of these reasons 
seem convincing: for example, few lawsuits 
now allege discriminatory failure to hire; in- 
stead, most contest discriminatory discharge, 
which does not give employers a strong in- 
centive to hire black applicants. Less persua- 
sively, the author suggests that firms may re- 
locate to areas of the country where 
minorities are scarce in order to avoid hiring 
them. The evidence for this proposition con- 
sists of a single employment discrimination 
case in which the plaintiff made this allega- 
tion. 
In sum, the book contains some material 
that labor economists will find useful. (Ch. 4 
gives a detailed analysis of a court case in 
which the author was an expert witness, and 
is particularly interesting for what it reveals 
about the use of economic analysis in a legal 
setting.) In the end, however, much of the 
book seems conclusory, and we are rarely 
given either the empirical evidence or the 
theoretical models that would justify many of 
the author's conclusions. 
PETER SIEGELMAN 
American Bar Foundaton, Chicago 
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The cost of talent: How executives and profes- 
sionals are paid and how it affects America. By 
DEREK BOK. New York: Macmillan, Free 
Press; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 
1993. Pp. vii, 342. $22.95. ISBN 0-02- 
903755-7. JEL 94-1197 
Why should the former President of Har- 
vard University be concerned that during the 
1970s and 1980s the earnings of doctors, law- 
yers in private practice, and top corporate ex- 
ecutives grew substantially relative to the 
earnings of professors, teachers, and high 
level federal civil servants? Why should he 
care that physicians with specialized hospital- 
based practices, such as neurosurgeons, have 
seen their earnings rise substantially relative 
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to physicians practicing family medicine dur- 
ing the same period? 
In each case, the answer is that Bok be- 
lieves that occupational choices are deter- 
mined, at least at the margin, by the pecuni- 
ary and nonpecuniary benefits that the 
various professions offer. Thus, he fears that 
the growing earnings differentials have di- 
verted America's "best and brightest" away 
from occupations that he considers vitally im- 
portant for our society, the professoriate, 
teaching, the federal civil service, and pri- 
mary care medicine. Given this belief, his 
goal is to put forth a menu of reforms that 
might induce an increased supply of talented 
individuals to these occupations. 
The Cost of Talent is divided into three 
parts. Part I summarizes the competitive the- 
ory of occupational choice, focusing on the 
role played by pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
compensation in the allocation of labor. 
While Bok acknowledges the substantial em- 
pirical evidence in support of this model, he 
stresses the role that market imperfections 
and institutions also play. In particular, in an 
extraordinarily useful historical survey that 
goes back to colonial times, he shows that the 
professionalization of law and medicine and 
their initial shift to becoming high paying oc- 
cupations occurred only after these fields es- 
tablished licensing and accreditation require- 
ments that were administered by professional 
associations. 
This section also documents the rapid 
growth in earnings of high level corporate ex- 
ecutives, private lawyers, and doctors that 
took place between 1970 and 1990. These 
relative earnings changes are shown to have 
been accompanied by an increase in the apti- 
tude test scores of people entering these 
fields and a decrease in scores of those enter- 
ing teaching. 
Having established the basic facts, Part II 
of The Cost of Talent presents an in-depth 
examination of the markets for corporate ex- 
ecutives, doctors, lawyers, university profes- 
sors, and teachers in the United States. In 
chapters devoted to each, Bok stresses the 
market forces and institutional arrangements 
that influence compensation, and hence 
the flow of talented individuals to the profes- 
sion. He then proposes reforms/institutional 
changes that might serve to limit compensa- 
tion in the fields that he believes currently 
get too many talented people and to increase 
compensation or improve working condi- 
tions in the fields that he believes have too 
few. 
The discussion in these chapters is wide- 
ranging. As part of it, a number of labor mar- 
ket theories are nontechnically summarized 
and evaluated. For example, the chapter on 
corporate executives discusses tournament 
models, efficiency wage theory, the principal 
agent problem, and evidence on the effective- 
ness of individual and group pay-for-perform- 
ance arrangements. Would that academic 
economists had as an impressive command of 
the legal literature as this academic law- 
yer/university president has of this economics 
literature! 
The reforms Bok discusses and evaluates 
often involve considerable restructuring of in- 
stitutional arrangements. They include reduc- 
ing the control top corporate executives have 
over the election of corporate board of direc- 
tors: shifting to a single payer form of na- 
tional health insurance; increasing the use of 
no fault insurance; and increasing compensa- 
tion and improving working conditions for 
teachers. In each case, Bok notes the difficul- 
ties involved in implementing the reform and 
thus the small likelihood that it will actually 
"provide" the solution to the problem he per- 
ceives. Indeed, given these difficulties, at 
points his focus shifts to a consideration of 
how to improve the quality of services pro- 
duced by the educational and governmental 
sectors, given the number and quality of em- 
ployees in the sectors. 
The final part of The Cost of Talent sums 
up the arguments, discusses in detail the im- 
portance of the values that society holds, and 
proposes the remedies that Bok perceives will 
be the most effective. Given the serious limi- 
tations that most of the latter have, he argues 
for an expansion of educational opportunities 
for the disadvantaged, so at least they will 
have a chance to compete for the large earn- 
ings that exist in the high paying professions. 
He argues that providing such opportunities 
is essential to the stability of American soci- 
ety. I suspect that this type of reasoning goes 
a long way toward explaining the policies to 
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diversify student bodies that developed at 
elite American universities and colleges, such 
as the one that Bok headed, over the last two 
decades. 
What does one ultimately conclude about 
The Cost of Talent? On the one hand, it is a 
very readable, well documented, and fascinat- 
ing treatment of the labor markets for a vari- 
ety of professions. Bok clearly illustrates how 
institutional reforms can affect the demand 
for and/or supply of talented individuals to 
professional occupations. This alone makes 
the book well worth reading. 
On the other hand, Bok's concern that 
there is an undersupply of talented people to 
academia, elementary and secondary educa- 
tion, and the federal civil service is itself a 
value judgment. While I personally agree 
with his judgment (for at least two of the 
fields), society as a whole probably does not. 
For example, cutbacks in the funding of 
public higher education in the early 1990s 
may reflect not only cyclical factors, but 
also the declining relative importance that 
Americans place on higher education, as 
concern over health, welfare, and criminal 
justice issues grows. Viewed in this light, 
Bok's book can be seen as an attempt to 
reorient the public's perceptions about the 
importance of the sectors he so clearly feels 
are undervalued. Unfortunately, many read- 
ers of his book will already be among the con- 
verted. 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG 
Cornell University 
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ies in Labour Markets and Economic Policy. 
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When asked what unions wanted, Samuel 
Gompers answered simply: "More!" The pre- 
cise and elegant nature of this answer has 
proven unattractive to students of trade union- 
ism and various attempts have been made to 
provide a deeper understanding of the deter- 
minates of union goals. Fifty years ago John 
Dunlop stimulated the debate by changing 
the question. Instead of being concerned 
about how preferences were aggregated or 
what determined the union membership 
function he inquired "What do unions maxi- 
mize?" If the union objective function could 
be agreed upon, testable predictions were 
easy to generate, and the study of union wage 
policy could be relegated to a well-under- 
stood case of derived demand subject to a 
(possibly nonlinear) constraint. 
Of course not all social scientists viewed 
Dunlop's efforts favorably. Arthur Ross's fa- 
mous Trade Union Wage Policy (Berkeley: 
University of California Press), written in 
1948, voiced the objection that unions were 
not economic institutions, interested only in 
maximizing, say, the wage bill, but political 
institutions as well, designed to express and 
consolidate the diversity of views represented 
in the union. Undoubtedly, Ross's conception 
of trade unions possessed more descriptive 
accuracy than Dunlop's, but it proved useless 
for generating testable predictions and has 
fallen by the wayside. 
Our understanding of trade union wage 
policy is still quite limited, so the Swedish 
Trade Union Institute for Economic Re- 
search organized a conference, at which ex- 
tended papers by Flanagan and by Moene, 
Wallerstein, and Hoel were presented. These 
papers are contained in this volume along 
with remarks by the discussants, Alistair Ulph 
for the Flanagan paper, Lars Calmfors for 
the Moene et al. paper, and Assar Lindbeck 
on both. The common theme of both pa- 
pers is that wage policy depends upon more 
than maximizing a utility function subject to 
the constraint of a demand curve but the 
authors pursue this point in very different 
ways. 
Flanagan's approach, described in seven 
short chapters (38 pages), is to examine 
whether collective choice models developed 
for the study of American legislative institu- 
tions by political scientists can deepen our 
understanding of union choices. He starts 
from the fundamental preference aggrega- 
tion-majority rule problem: anything is possi- 
ble including endless cycles. Yet union policy 
hardly seems to cycle; if anything, unions, 
like most political bodies, seem too persist- 
ent, stubbornly, sometimes heroically, hold- 
